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1It should be noted that the WTO applies a system of self-selection to the categorisation of
members as developing countries. The sub-category of least-developed countries (LDCs) is
instead determined by means of the LDC list maintained and updated by the United Nations
Conference of Trade and Development. The term ‘developing countries’ as used in this article
includes the sub-category of LDCs unless otherwise specified.
2The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)
is one of the outcomes of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which led to the creation of
the WTO. It is one of the multilateral agreements on trade in goods found in Annex 1A to the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, adopted on 15 April 1994. It entered
into force on 1 January 1995. See The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: The Legal Texts (1994) 69-84. 
3European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Trade or Marketing of Biotech
Products. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Argentina WT/DS293/17 8 August 2003.
This dispute concerns the European Communities’ de facto moratorium on the approval of
‘Operationalising’ special and differential
treatment of developing countries under
the SPS Agreement
Denise Prévost*
Introduction
Special and differential treatment (SDT) of developing countries is provided
for in many of the agreements of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), in
order to take account of developing country1 constraints. However, the
effectiveness and enforceability of these provisions has been called into
question, and they are seldom relied upon in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings. The need for effective SDT is particularly acute when it comes to
WTO agreements creating extensive disciplines in areas of national regulation.
One such agreement is the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).2 
It is therefore noteworthy that Argentina has recently taken the step of
relying on an SDT provision in the SPS Agreement, in the pending EC-
Biotech dispute.3 It is the first time, since the coming into force of the SPS
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agricultural biotechnology products, as well as the introduction by some EC member states of
bans on products of agricultural biotechnology that have already been approved by the EC.
Parallel disputes on the same matter have been initiated by Canada (WT/DS292) and the United
States (WT/DS291). On 29 August 2003, a single panel was established to hear all three
disputes, and composed on 4 March 2004. The panel proceedings are currently on-going after
being extended four times. In his latest communication, the chairman of the panel reported that
the panel estimates that it will issue its final report to the parties by the end of December 2005
(see WT/DS291/29; WT/DS292/23; WT/DS293/23).
4The term ‘operationalisation’ is currently commonly used in WTO discussions on SDT, as
shorthand for the concept of making SDT provisions more precise, effective and operational.
It will be used in this sense in this article.
Agreement in 1995, that a member of the WTO has tried to enforce its
special rules in favour of developing countries, in dispute settlement
proceedings. The way the Panel in this case will deal with the SDT issue is
likely to have far-reaching implications, not only for the position of
developing countries under the SPS Agreement, but also for the current
discussions in the Doha Development Round negotiations at the WTO on
how to make SDT provisions more effective and operational. 
This article aims to evaluate the existing SDT provisions in the SPS
Agreement, in order to determine the possibilities open to the Panel to give
them an effective interpretation. While inspired by Argentina’s initiative in
the EC-Biotech dispute, it will not limit itself to an examination of the
particular provision relied upon by Argentina, and the arguments it made in
support of its claim. Instead, it will look more generally at SDT provisions
in the SPS Agreement. 
First, the context for the discussion will be set by means of a brief look at the
current negotiations on SDT at the WTO, in the ongoing Doha Round. Then,
the need for SDT in the SPS Agreement will be addressed. Thereafter, the
actual SDT provisions in the SPS Agreement will be scrutinised more closely to
determine whether enforceable obligations can be derived from them. The dis-
appointing experience with regard to implementation of many of these provi-
sions, in the first ten years of operation of this agreement, will be considered.
The possibilities for making the SDT provisions operational in dispute
settlement will thereafter be examined. This will be done in the light of previous
panel and Appellate Body decisions on similar provisions in other agreements,
from which guidance might be drawn for the interpretation of SDT provisions in
the SPS Agreement. Finally, conclusions will be drawn with regard to the effect
of the possibilities open to panels to enforce existing SDT provisions in this
agreement, on the deadlocked Doha Round negotiations in this area.
Doha Round negotiations on SDT
The ‘operationalisation’4 of special and differential treatment of developing
countries is currently a burning issue at the WTO. Developing countries
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5It is not the aim of this article to provide an overview of SDT in the WTO. For an extensive and
useful discussion of this issue, see Page and Kleen ‘Special and differential treatment of
developing countries in the World Trade Organization’ (2005) 2 Global Development Studies.
6Ministerial Conference Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns. Decision of 14 November 2001
WT/MIN(01)/17 20 November 2001 I (Implementation Decision). This decision was adopted having
regard to articles IV:1, IV:5 and IX of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO. Although this
decision cannot be regarded as one of the ‘covered agreements’ regarding which WTO dispute
settlement proceedings can be brought (in terms of article 1.1 of the DSU), it is clearly relevant for
dispute settlement as a ‘subsequent agreement’ between the parties regarding the application of the
provisions of a treaty, under article 31.3(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The
relevance of this decision for the SDT provisions of the SPS Agreement is discussed further below.
7Ministerial Conference Ministerial Declaration adopted on 14 November 2001
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 20 November 2001 par 2.
8Id at par 44.
9The Doha Implementation Decision n 6 above instructs the Committee on Trade and Development
(CTD) to identify which SDT provisions are mandatory and which are non-binding and to consider
the implications of making the non-binding provisions mandatory. Further, it must examine
additional ways to make SDT provisions more effective. The deadline by which the CTD had to
report to the General Council with clear recommendations was July 2002. See n 6 above at par 12.
In terms of this mandate, delegations asked the WTO Secretariat to produce an informal factual paper
giving an overview of mandatory and non-mandatory SDT provisions. The secretariat has done so
in two comprehensive documents. See CTD Non-mandatory Special and Differential Treatment
Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions. Note by the Secretariat. Addendum
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev 1/Add 3 4 February 2002, CTD Implementation of Special and Differential
Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions. A Review of Mandatory Special and
have repeatedly raised concerns with regard to the lack of implementation
of SDT provisions, which they regard as the quid pro quo for the extensive
commitments they undertook in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.
As part of the effort to bring developing countries back on board after the
failure of the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, these implementation
concerns have received increased attention. 
There is renewed recognition at the WTO of the need to ensure that developing
countries fully share in the benefits of the trading system, by taking into
account their special needs and constraints.5 At the Doha Ministerial Meeting
in 2001, concrete steps were taken towards this objective. First, the Ministerial
Conference adopted the Implementation Decision, which embodies decisions to
address developing country concerns regarding problems with implementation
of certain provisions in WTO agreements, including those on SDT, and sets out
a work programme on SDT.6 Second, the Ministerial Declaration setting the
agenda for trade negotiations in the ongoing Doha Round, known as the Doha
Development Agenda, ‘seek[s] to place developing country needs and interests
at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in [that] Declaration’.7 One of the
ways it aims to achieve this is by recognising that SDT provisions are ‘an
integral part of the WTO Agreements’ and mandating a review of these
provisions with a view to ‘strengthening them and making them more precise,
effective and operational’.8 It thus endorses the work programme set out in the
Implementation Decision in this regard.9
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Differential Treatment Provisions. Note by the Secretariat. Addendum WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev
1/Add 2 21 December 2001. The conclusions in these papers will be mentioned below where
relevant to the SDT provisions of the SPS Agreement
10There is significant disagreement with regard to the question whether cross-cutting principles
for SDT should first be agreed upon (a view espoused by several developed members), or
whether negotiations should rather focus on agreement-specific SDT proposals (the approach
preferred by many developing members). This disagreement has hampered progress in the
negotiations. For a useful summary of the negotiations in this regard, see Doha Round Briefing
Series. Cancun Update: Special and Differential Treatment vol 2 No 13 August 2003; Doha
Round Briefing Series. Developments since the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference: Special
and Differential Treatment vol 1 No 13 February 2003.
11Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Special and Differential Treatment
Proposals Schedule of Work. Decision by the Committee G/SPS/26 2 July 2003.
12Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Implementation and Special and Differential
Treatment: Report by the Chairman to the General Council G/SPS/30 20 November 2003). In this
report, while mention is made of achievements with regard to the outstanding implementation
issues referred to the SPS Committee in the Doha Implementation Decision, in contrast, with regard
to the SDT proposals referred to it by the General Council there is only a brief report on comments
received and on-going work. In August 2004, the General Council again referred agreement-
specific proposals to the relevant WTO bodies, including the SPS Committee, with the instruction
that they expeditiously complete consideration of thereof, and report back with recommendations
by July 2005. See General Council Doha Work Programme. Decision Adopted by the General
Council on 1 August 2004 WT/L/579.
13This report notes ‘The SPS Committee has been unable to develop any clear recommendations for
a decision on the proposals on special and differential treatment referred to it by the General Council’.
See Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Report on Proposals for Special and
Differential Treatment. Adopted by the Committee on 30 June 2005 G/SPS/35 7 July 2005 pars 40-41.
14This raises interesting issues with regard to the balance between the political and dispute-
settlement organs of the WTO. It is beyond the ambit of this article to address the debate regarding
whether there is an institutional imbalance between the WTO’s consensus-based, inefficient rule-
making procedures and its highly efficient, automatic dispute settlement system. For contributions
to this important discussion, see Lorand Bartels ‘The separation of powers in the WTO: How to
avoid judicial activism’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 861-895; Joost Pauwelyn ‘The transformation of world
trade’ (2005) 104 Michigan Law Review 1-66. See further, Ignacio Garcia Bercero ‘Functioning
of the WTO system: Elements for possible institutional reform’ (2000) 6 International Trade Law
and Regulation 103: 105; Frieder Roessler ‘The institutional balance between the judicial and the
political organs of the WTO,’ in Bronckers and Quick (eds) New directions in International
Economic Law: Essays in honour of John H Jackson (2000) 325-345; and Claus-Dieter Ehlermann
‘Tensions between the dispute settlement process and the diplomatic and treaty-making activities
To date, the Doha Round negotiations on SDT at the WTO have borne little
fruit.10 This is also the case with regard to those SDT proposals relating to the
SPS Agreement that were referred to the SPS Committee by the General
Council. The SPS Committee was unable to reach agreement on these
proposals upon completion of its SDT work programme11 in 2003,12 and again
in 2005. The latest report of the SPS Committee to the General Council reflects
this stalemate, and notes that there is an ‘expectations gap’ between members
in this regard.13 
In the absence of progress towards addressing concerns with the effectiveness
of SDT provisions through negotiations, the possibilities that exist for
enforcing existing SDT provisions in dispute settlement gain in significance.14
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of the WTO’ (2002) 1/3 World Trade Review 301-308.
15Article 3.2 of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides that the dispute
settlement system serves to clarify the existing provisions of the agreements ‘in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law’. These rules are reflected in articles
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as held by the Appellate Body in US-
Gasoline and in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II. See Appellate Body Report United States-Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline WT/DS2/AB/R 20 May 1996 DSR 1996 I 3 at 17;
and Appellate Body Report Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages WT/DS8/AB/R WT/DS10/AB/R
WT/DS11/AB/R 1 November 1996 DSR 1996 I 97 at 10.
16Bernard Hoekman et al More Favorable Differential Treatment of Developing Countries:
Towards a new approach in the WTO Working Paper 3107 August 2003 at 3; J. Michael Finger
‘The Uruguay Round North-South bargain: Will the WTO get over it?’ in Kennedy and
Southwick (eds) The political economy of international trade law. Essays in honor of Robert E
Hudec (2002) 301-310 at 306.
17Broadly speaking, the term ‘SPS measures’ refers to all laws, regulations, decrees, requirements
and procedures aimed at protecting human, animal or plant life or health from food-borne risks or
risks from pests or diseases. See the definition in Annex A, par 1 of the SPS Agreement. 
18Article 1.1 of the SPS Agreement.
19Article 3 of the SPS Agreement. This article does not oblige Members to harmonise their
measures, but instead gives them three autonomous options. Members may: (1) base their
measure on international standards; (2) conform their measure to international standards and
thereby benefit from a presumption of consistency with the entire SPS Agreement and the
GATT (3) adopt a measure resulting in a higher level of protection than the international
standard, provided it is justified by means of a risk assessment. Article 3 was clarified by the
Appellate Body in EC-Hormones WT/DS26/AB/R WT/DS48/AB/R 13 February 1998.
It is the task of panels and the Appellate Body to interpret these, and other,
provisions in WTO agreements in a way that gives meaning and effect to them.
The extent to which it is possible to ‘operationalise’ the SDT provisions, within
the limits of the customary rules of interpretation to which panels are bound,15
therefore deserves attention. A short examination of the need for special
treatment of developing countries in the SPS Agreement precedes this analysis,
in order to highlight the importance of operationalising its SDT provisions. 
The need for SDT in the SPS Agreement
In the current discussion on SDT in the WTO, there is wide recognition of the
fact that ‘one size does not fit all’16 when it comes to regulatory disciplines in
trade rules. This general observation is particularly on point when it comes to
the SPS Agreement. 
The SPS Agreement aims to balance the competing goals of trade liberalisation
and the protection of health. It does so by recognising the sovereign right of
governments to protect human, animal and plant health in their territories,
while establishing disciplines on their ability to do so in ways that restrict trade
in the agri-food sector. All sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures17 that
affect trade must be applied in accordance with its rules.18 
The SPS Agreement encourages members to harmonise their SPS measures19
by basing them on international standards developed by international standard-
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20Annex A par 3 of the SPS Agreement identifies the relevant international standard-setting
bodies for purposes of the SPS Agreement, namely the Codex Alimentarius Commission (for
food-safety issues); the International Office of Epizootics, now called the World Animal Health
Organisation (for animal health issues); and the International Plant Protection Convention (for
phytosanitary issues). 
21The requirements for a risk assessment are set out in article 5.1 and 5.2 and Annex A par 4 of
the SPS Agreement. In article 5.7, allowance is made for provisional measures when scientific
evidence is insufficient.
22Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.
23Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.
24Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement.
25While developing country attendance of plenary meetings of the standard-setting bodies where
standards are adopted is increasing, following new initiatives in this area by these bodies, their
participation is not very effective. They are often not well prepared for the discussions at these
meetings, having not participated in the process of preparation of standards in the technical
committees, and they often lack the necessary national data to provide a meaningful input into
the discussions. 
26Hamwey notes that, ‘… the playing field resulting from international trade agreements that
have ostensibly equivalent rules for all contracting parties, may provide a much smaller policy
space for developing than developed countries because of differences in initial conditions and
national policy implementation capacities’. Robert M Hamwey Expanding National Policy
Space for Development: Why the Multilateral Trading System Must Change Working Paper 25,
September 2005.
setting bodies.20 A member that does not base its measure on an international
standard must justify this by means of a risk assessment satisfying the
requirements of the SPS Agreement.21 In addition, members must meet various
other requirements, including those regarding consistency in choice of level of
SPS protection,22 use of the least trade-restrictive measure,23 and prior
notification of measures.24 These disciplines are resource-intensive and require
a capacity that many developing countries do not have. 
For example, developing countries have difficulty participating effectively in
international standard setting,25 with the result that the benchmark standards
often do not reflect developing country circumstances and constraints. In
addition, lack of scientific expertise and data collection capacity make it
difficult for many developing countries to meet the complex requirements for a
risk assessment to justify their deviation from international standards. The
transparency and other disciplines of the SPS Agreement also require a well-
developed regulatory infrastructure. Making the necessary investments in this
area would often mean that developing countries must divert scarce resources
from other development priorities.
Thus, the SPS Agreement, like other WTO agreements creating disciplines for
behind-the-border regulatory regimes, necessitates the recognition of
differences in capacity across different levels of development. The ability of
countries to comply with, and benefit from, their rules depends on their
‘starting position’.26 In other words, the existing situation in a country, such as
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27Stevens argues that this is particularly necessary now that the improved dispute settlement system
has eliminated much of the flexibility that characterised the GATT. As a result, ‘in order to avoid
adverse, unintended consequences from dispute settlement (or the threat thereof), the WTO needs
new mechanisms to balance precise rules and appropriate flexibility…’. See Christopher Stevens
‘Recognising reality: Balancing precision and flexibility in WTO rules’ presented at the Joint
ICTSD-GP International Dialogue: Making Special and Differential Treatment More Effective and
Responsive to Development Needs, Chavannes-de-Bogis, Switzerland: International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development, 6 and 7 May 2003 at 3.
28The link between policy space for development and SDT is recognised by Hamwey, who
argues that, ‘… special and differential treatment (S&DT) for developing countries under the
[multilateral trading system] needs to be enhanced and made more actionable and effective in
order to provide developing countries with essential national policy space for development’.
Robert M Hamwey n 11 above.
29This recognition persists in the current SDT discussions. See Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, Report on Proposals for Special and Differential Treatment n 13 above
at par 5
the strength of its regulatory system, its infrastructure, human and financial
resources, etcetera, will affect the impact of regulatory disciplines on that
country. 
It is therefore necessary to find ways to ensure that agreements laying down
regulatory disciplines, such as the SPS Agreement, are development-friendly.27
They should leave sufficient space for countries to pursue their development
policies through national regulation, while at the same time create clear and
workable rules to ensure market access. This difficult balance is aimed at by
provisions in WTO agreements on SDT of developing countries.28
More specifically, the need for SDT in the SPS Agreement arises in two main
areas. The first concerns the disciplines of the SPS Agreement itself, namely
these countries’ difficulties with compliance with the resource-intensive
obligations of the agreement and their lack of capacity to enforce their rights
under the agreement. The second area goes beyond the SPS Agreement and
relates to the constraints on developing countries’ ability to meet the SPS
requirements of their trading partners, even when these are consistent with the
SPS Agreement. Both these areas need to be addressed in order to ensure that
developing countries are in a position to reap the benefits of the SPS
Agreement without bearing a disproportionate burden of costs.
At the same time, as was widely recognised by the negotiators of the SPS
Agreement, any mechanisms to deal with developing country concerns should
not jeopardise the right of a member to impose scientifically justified measures
necessary to prevent unacceptable risks to human, plant or animal life or
health.29 To do so would not only lead to risks of harmful effects on human
health and agricultural production, contrary to the duties of governments, but
would also be counterproductive. It would fuel consumer fears, leading to a
decrease in demand for products originating in developing countries, and harm
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30Ibid.
31See the 7th preambular recital of the SPS Agreement.
32It should be noted that some of the substantive disciplines in the SPS Agreement also contain
elements of flexibility that can be used to the benefit of developing countries. For example,
article 5.1 requires a risk assessment ‘as appropriate to the circumstances’ and article 5.6 allows
technical and economic feasibility to be taken into account in the choice of an SPS measure.
However, as these flexibilities are available to all members, they cannot be regarded as a form
of SDT and will consequently not be discussed in this article. 
the reputation of such exporting countries by casting doubts on their regulatory
capacities.30 Similarly, difficulties with implementation of the regulatory
disciplines of the agreement should not be dealt with by means of a relaxation
of the rules. Creating loopholes though which measures that are disguised
forms of protectionism can slip would undermine the market access gains
achieved by the SPS Agreement. Thus, it is important to find ways of helping
developing countries to overcome their constraints without weakening
legitimate SPS measures or watering down the disciplines of the agreement.
The extent to which SDT in the SPS Agreement achieves this difficult
objective needs to be examined. 
Provision of SDT in the SPS Agreement
The general disciplines on SPS measures contained in the SPS Agreement
apply equally to developed and developing countries. However, the SPS
Agreement does recognise the financial and technical resource constraints
that developing countries face. This consideration finds its first reflection in
the preamble to the SPS Agreement, which recognises that:
… developing country Members may encounter special difficulties in
complying with sanitary and phytosanitary measures of importing Members,
and as a consequence in access to markets, and also in the formulation and
application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in their own territories,
and desir[es] to assist them in their endeavors in this regard; ... 31 
The degree to which this recognition is given effect in the operational
provisions of the SPS Agreement, and their implementation, is interesting to
examine.
Specific provisions exist in the SPS Agreement to take into account the
special constraints of developing countries by providing them with some
flexibility and assistance with regard to both their compliance with the SPS
measures of other members, and their implementation of the obligations of
the SPS Agreement. The main SDT provisions can be found in article 10 of
the SPS Agreement, entitled ‘Special and Differential Treatment’. However,
article 14 and paragraphs 2, 8 and 9 of Annex B also reflect consideration of
developing country constrains and can thus be regarded as forms of SDT.32
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33Process-based requirements are those that address the process of production of a product,
whereas product-based requirements focus on the characteristics of the final product. An
example of a process-based requirement is the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
(HACCP) system. HACCP is a method used to ensure food safety by analysing potential hazards
in the production process, identifying the points where they can be controlled and setting up
process parameters and their critical limits to achieve this control, as well as establishing follow-
up procedures. Many developed countries currently apply HACCP requirements in a growing
number of areas (such as fishery products). An example of a product-based requirement is the
For this reason, while the focus of the following discussion will be on
article 10, other relevant articles will be examined where relevant.
SDT with regard to SPS measures of other members
Many developing countries rely on food and agricultural products for a
large part of their export earnings. They therefore have a significant interest
in access to the markets of their trading partners for these products. The
prevalence of strict SPS measures in developed countries form barriers to
market access. The disciplines of the SPS Agreement aim to ensure that SPS
measures are not misused as disguised forms of protection of domestic
markets. Therefore, SPS measures that are not scientifically justified would
fall foul of its rules. 
However, the SPS Agreement recognises the sovereign right of members to
choose their own level of protection against scientifically proven SPS risks.
In developed countries, consumer demands and technological capacity often
result in the choice of very high levels of protection, reflected in strict SPS
requirements. Thus, many legitimate SPS measures exist that comply with
the requirements of the agreement, yet present considerable hurdles to
market access for developing countries. 
In order to overcome this problem, it is necessary to make provision for SDT
of developing countries in respect of the SPS measures applied by other WTO
members. This SDT should ensure appropriate regard for developing country
constraints, without endangering the level of SPS protection chosen by the
importing member. The extent to which SDT in the SPS Agreement achieves
this will now be examined by looking in detail at the relevant provisions. 
Consideration in the preparation and application of SPS measures
Many of the problems faced by developing countries with regard to meeting
the SPS requirements of their trading partners could be avoided, if regard
were had to their constraints during the process of drafting the measures or
in their application. For example, some developed countries apply onerous
and complex testing requirements to verify compliance with their SPS
requirements, which developing countries lack the technology to meet.
Similarly, process-based SPS requirements,33 while routine for more
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classic inspection requirement applied, for example, to fish and food products, based on the
analysis of samples of the final product.
34In the WTO Secretariat’s review of SDT provisions, this article is classified as a mandatory
provision, creating an ‘obligation of conduct’, in that it does not prescribe a particular result. See
CTD Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and
Decisions n 9 above at 9. 
35Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Special and Differential Treatment: Note
by the Secretariat, G/SPS/W/105 9 May 2000 par 4.
36CTD Information on the Utilisation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions. Note by
the Secretariat. Addendum WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev 1/Add 4 7 February 2002 at 21-22.
37The notification format is a recommended guideline developed by the Secretariat in 1996 to assist
countries in compliance with the notification requirements of the SPS Agreement. It has since been
revised twice, and an addendum thereto developed for notification of the recognition of
equivalence. See Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Recommended Notification
Procedures for Implementing the Transparency Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7).
Revision G/SPS/7/Rev 2 2 April 2002; Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Notification of Determination of the Recognition of Equivalence of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures. Decision by the Committee. Addendum G/SPS/7/Rev 2/Add 1 25 July 2002.
38Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Enhancing Transparency of Special and
Differential (S&D) Treatment within the SPS Agreement. Submission by Canada G/SPS/W/127
30 October 2002. Egypt, in turn, responded to this proposal in Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Comments on the Canadian Proposal. Statement by Egypt at the
Meeting of 7-8 November 2002 G/SPS/GEN/358 15 November 2002.
developed members, are beyond some developing countries’ capabilities.
Active consideration of developing country circumstances could lead to the
framing of SPS measures and the application thereof in ways that facilitate
compliance by developing countries, without endangering the level of SPS
protection sought.
For this reason, article 10.1 of the SPS Agreement provides that members
‘shall’ take account of the special needs of developing country members,
and in particular least-developed country members, when preparing and
applying SPS measures. This is the only SDT provision in article 10 of the
SPS Agreement that is couched in mandatory terms, and thus creates an
obligation for members.34
However, the strength of this obligation can be questioned. Developing
countries have expressed the concern that their constraints are, in practice,
rarely taken into account in the preparation and application of SPS
measures.35 In its review of the utilisation of SDT provisions, the WTO
Secretariat reported that it had no information regarding the use of this
provision.36 These concerns led, in 2002, to a proposal by Egypt of a new
SDT ‘box’ in the SPS notification format,37 in which the notifying member
should, ex ante, identify the SDT component of its measure. In response,
Canada proposed that SDT be notified ex post, as an addendum to the
notified measure.38 Based on the Canadian proposal, the SPS Committee has
adopted a new notification format for addenda to indicate when SDT has
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39The Canadian proposal was adopted in principle in 2003, and an elaboration of steps to
implement this procedure was adopted in 2004. See Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures Procedure to Enhance Transparency of Special and Differential Treatment in Favour
of Developing Country Members. Decision by the Committee G/SPS/33 2 November 2004.
40One possible incidence of use of this format (although predating its final adoption) is the
submission of an addendum to a notification by the EC of its decision to allow more flexibility
on the dates of application of two elements of its protective measures against plant pests in wood
packaging materials (see official document symbol G/SPS/N/EEC/221/Add 2 14 October 2004).
41See the unofficial translation of Argentina’s submission European Communities-Measures
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (WT/DS293). First Written
Submission of the Argentine Republic (Courtesy Translation) (2004). 
42Id at par 182. In order to indicate its ‘special needs’ as a developing country, Argentina points
to the fact that it is highly dependent on agricultural production and exports, and that the
survival of a large sector of its population depends on access to markets for these products,
including those produced through biotechnology. Id at par 185.
43European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products.
First Written Submission by the European Communities 17 May 2004 par 666.
44Id at par 667.
45Id at pars 670-671.
been requested in the context of a notified SPS measure, and what response
has been given to such a request.39 To date, little, if any, use has been made
of this notification format.40 This seems indicative of continued inadequate
implementation of article 10.1, despite its mandatory wording.
Although article 10.1 has never been addressed by a panel or the Appellate
Body in a dispute to date, it has, as mentioned above, recently been raised as a
challenge by Argentina in the pending EC-Biotech dispute.41 Argentina
emphasises the mandatory nature of this provision and claims that it requires
more than mere attention to developing country problems. Instead, it requires
‘positive action’, in this case ‘implementation of Member obligations in a
manner that is beneficial or less detrimental to the interests of developing
nations’.42 According to Argentina, the European Communities (EC) has failed
to comply with this obligation.
The EC has countered these arguments by stating that it does ‘bear [SDT
provisions] in mind when developing and applying its legislation, including,
where relevant, its GMO legislation’.43 It further argues that Argentina’s
claim amounted to ‘nothing more than saying that since the European
Communities has violated other provisions of the agreements and this
affects Argentina, a developing country, it has consequently also failed to
comply with its obligations of special and differential treatment towards
developing countries’.44 Finally, the EC disputes the factual assertion that
developing country exports have been restricted by its measure, but avers
that trade statistics show that its imports from developing countries that
have widely adopted biotechnology in agriculture have increased since
1995/1996.45 
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46European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products
(WT/DS293). Written Rebuttal of the Republic of Argentina 19 July 2004 pars 113-115.
47Id at par 117.
48Id at par 122.
49Panel Report European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed
Linen from India WT/DS141/R 12 March 2001 as modified by the Appellate Body Report
WT/DS141/AB/R. 
50Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides: ‘It is recognized that special regard must
be given by developed country Members to the special situation of developing country Members
when considering the application of anti-dumping measures under this Agreement. Possibilities
of constructive remedies provided for by this Agreement shall be explored before applying anti-
dumping duties where they would affect the essential interests of developing country Members.’
(Emphasis added).
51Panel Report EC-Bed Linen n 34 above at note 85.
52‘In our view, while the exact parameters of the term are difficult to establish, the concept of
“explore” clearly does not imply any particular outcome. We recall that Article 15 does not require
that “constructive remedies” must be explored, but rather that the “possibilities” of such remedies
must be explored, which further suggests that the exploration may conclude that no possibilities
exist, or that no constructive remedies are possible, in the particular circumstances of a given case.
Taken in its context, however, and in light of the object and purpose of Article 15, we do consider
In response, Argentina disputes the EC’s view, implicit in its arguments,
that article 10.1 is discretionary and a member can thus have regard to
developing country needs when it deems it ‘relevant’.46 Secondly, Argentina
points out that the obligation contained in article 10.1 is separate, and not
consequential on the violation of other provisions of the SPS Agreement.47
Finally, Argentina questions how data on trade flows can be an indication
that developing country needs have been taken into account.48
It remains to be seen what the panel will make of these arguments. In the
meantime, WTO case law on other mandatory SDT provisions can be
usefully examined to establish the likelihood that a challenge of non-
compliance with article 10.1, such as that of Argentina, will be successful. 
The panel in EC-Bed Linen49 was faced with a claim of violation of the SDT
provision contained in article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.50 Like
article 10.1 of the SPS Agreement, article 15 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement is framed in mandatory terms. It provides in its first sentence
that special regard ‘must’ be given to the special situation of developing
country members, when considering the application of anti-dumping duties.
In its second sentence it provides that the possibilities of constructive
remedies ‘shall’ be explored where essential interests of developing
countries are at stake. The panel noted that both parties in that dispute, the
EC and India, had agreed that the first sentence of article 15 imposes no
legal obligations on developed country members. Thus, the panel expressed
no views on this matter.51 Focusing on the second sentence, the panel held
that it does create an obligation to consider actively, with an open mind, the
possibility of constructive remedies before imposing an anti-dumping duty
that would affect the essential interests of a developing member.52 
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that the “exploration” of possibilities must be actively undertaken by the developed country
authorities with a willingness to reach a positive outcome. Thus, in our view, Article 15 imposes
no obligation to actually provide or accept any constructive remedy that may be identified and/or
offered. It does, however, impose an obligation to actively consider, with an open mind, the
possibility of such a remedy prior to imposition of an anti-dumping measure that would affect the
essential interests of a developing country.’ Id at par 6.233. This issue was not appealed.
53Panel Report United States-Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from
India WT/DS206/R and Corr 1 29 July 2002. It is interesting that India in this case no longer
held the view, stated in EC-Bed Linen, that the first sentence of article 15 contains no legal
obligation. Instead, while acknowledging that ‘it does not set out any specific legal requirements
for specific action’, India claimed that, ‘this mandatory provision does create a general
obligation, the precise parameters of which are to be determined based on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case’. Id at par 7.110.
54Ibid. In addition, as the provision refers to ‘developing country Members’ the panel held that
it could not oblige consideration of the situation of companies operating in developing countries.
It stated, ‘Simply because a company is operating in a developing country does not mean that
it somehow shares the “special situation” of the developing country Member’. Id at par 7.111.
This Panel Report was not appealed.
55Panel Report European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or
Pipe Fittings from Brazil WT/DS219/R 18 August 2003, as modified by the Appellate Body
Report WT/DS219/AB/R. In this case Brazil argued that the first sentence of article 15 contains
‘a general obligation to pay particular attention to the special situation of developing Members,
while the second sentence concerns one possible way of fulfilling this obligation’. It claimed
that the EC did not have regard to the special situation of Brazil as a developing member (the
specificity of the Brazilian tax rebate system which is unlike the sophisticated VAT systems in
developed countries and the devaluation of the Brazilian currency) and conducted itself in the
same way as it would have done when dealing with a developed member. Id at par 7.57.
56The panel further found that the second sentence of article 15 provides operational indications
as to the nature of the specific action required. Thus compliance with the obligations in the
second sentence would necessarily ‘constitute fulfilment of any general obligation that might
arguably be contained in the first sentence’. Id at par 7.68. The panel’s interpretation of article
15 was not appealed. 
The first sentence of article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement was again
at issue before the panel in US-Steel Plate.53 Despite the word ‘must’ in this
sentence, the panel held:
Members cannot be expected to comply with an obligation whose parameters
are entirely undefined. In our view, the first sentence of Article 15 imposes no
specific or general obligation on Members to undertake any particular action.54 
On the same issue, the panel in EC-Pipe Fittings55 found that: 
… even assuming that the first sentence of Article 15 imposes a general
obligation on Members, it clearly contains no operational language delineating
the precise extent or nature of that obligation or requiring a developed country
Member to undertake any specific action.56 
It appears from these cases that the use of mandatory language in SDT
provisions is not sufficient to make them enforceable. In addition, SDT
provisions must contain specific obligations to undertake particular action
before a claim of violation can succeed. This result is particularly problematic
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57An example of a possible application of article 10.1 to ensure consideration of developing
country constraints, by providing additional flexibility in particular, ad hoc, circumstances, is
the following. In 2005, Sri Lanka requested that the EC suspend its ban on Sri Lankan cinnamon
containing sulphur dioxide, and establish instead a maximum residue level of 150 parts per
million, pending the development of an international standard. According to Sri Lanka, this
would satisfy the EC’s obligations under article 10.1. See Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Trade Difficulties Encountered in the Export of Sri Lankan Cinnamon
to the European Communities. Communication by Sri Lanka G/SPS/GEN/597 10 October 2005.
58Appellate Body Report United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
WT/DS2/AB/R 20 May 1996, DSR 1996 I 3 at 23. As noted in n 15 above, article 3.2 of the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding requires that WTO agreements be clarified ‘in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law’, which have been
held to be reflected in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
when one takes into account the purpose of SDT, which is to provide the
flexibility to respond to the special needs of developing countries. What the
needs of particular developing countries are varies from case to case.
Developing countries are not a homogenous group. Instead, there are vast
differences in their levels of economic and human development, export
diversification, ability to absorb costs from trade-restrictive measures and to
adapt to new economic circumstances, and therefore also in their ‘special
situation’. To require that an SDT provision, to be effective and enforceable,
must specify the required action to be taken in response to developing country
needs undermines the very flexibility that characterises SDT.57
The prospect of applying this line of case law to article 10.1 of the SPS
Agreement is not heartening. Article 10.1 merely requires that members ‘take
account’ of developing (and least-developed) countries’ special needs, and is
thus very similar to the first sentence of article 15 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Article 10.1 does not oblige WTO members actually to adapt their
SPS measures or the application thereof to address developing country needs,
or even to explore the possibility of doing so. As a result, not even the
obligation to ‘actively consider with an open mind’ alternative SPS measures
or application procedures, is likely to be found to be contained in this
provision. The risk exists that this provision may turn out to be, for practical
purposes, a dead letter. 
Militating against this result is the principle of effective treaty
interpretation, which requires that effect be given to all provisions of a
treaty. In US-Gasoline, the Appellate Body held: 
One of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna
Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of
a treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing
whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.58 
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59The WTO Secretariat categorised this provision as a non-mandatory provision in the review
of SDT provisions it conducted for the CTD. It noted that the provision could be made
mandatory by replacing the word ‘should’ with ‘shall’. Alternatively it suggested that an
authoritative interpretation of this provision could be adopted (pursuant to article IX:2 of the
Marrakesh Agreement) clarifying that ‘should’ in article 10.2 must be read to express a duty
rather than an exhortation. See CTD Non-Mandatory Special and Differential Treatment
Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions. Note by the Secretariat. Addendum
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev 1/Add 3 4 February 2002 at 6.
This principle has been consistently followed in subsequent cases. It is
therefore likely that a panel interpreting article 10.1 will consider itself
bound to give some effect thereto, even if the provision itself is not regarded
as enforceable. One way of doing so, appears to be by seeing it as reflecting
the ‘general policy’ with regard to SDT, and therefore using it to inform
related provisions, which give its general exhortation more concrete effect.
It is now necessary to examine the remaining SDT provisions in the SPS
Agreement to determine if they can be regarded as giving effect to the
obligation contained in article 10.1, in the same way that the second
paragraph of article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, ‘operationalises’
the first paragraph.
Longer compliance periods
Compliance with new SPS measures often entails considerable changes to
production and processing systems in developing countries. Particularly
where the existing domestic SPS regime is very different from the new
requirements on foreign markets, and supporting public services and
infrastructure are weak, compliance may require substantial efforts and
investments. Thus, time is needed to find the necessary resources and to
make the required changes. If exports from developing countries are
immediately subject to the new SPS measures, they risk being excluded
from their export markets while producers are adapting to the new measure.
This would result not only in loss of export revenue, but also in loss of
market share, which may have significant long-term effects. To address this
problem, article 10.2 of the SPS Agreement makes provision for the phased
introduction of new SPS measures. It provides that members ‘should’ allow
longer time frames for compliance with new SPS measures on products of
interest to developing country members, where the appropriate level of
protection of the importing member allows. This is aimed at allowing
developing countries to maintain their export opportunities while adjusting
to the new measures, in cases where this would not undermine the SPS
protection sought by the importing member. However, it would appear at
first sight from the hortatory wording of this provision, that it encourages,
rather than obliges, members to grant developing countries extended
compliance periods.59
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60A group of developing countries (Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda) proposed that
article 10.2 be modified to include a mandatory period of at least twelve months between the
date of notification of the measure and its entry into force for products from developing
countries. See Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Special and Differential
Treatment: Note by the Secretariat G/SPS/W/105 9 May 2000 par 7.
61Implementation  Decision n 6 above at par 3.1.
62Panel Report European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed
Linen from India - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by India WT/DS141/RW 24 April 2003
as modified by the Appellate Body Report WT/DS141/AB/RW.
63The panel held, ‘[W]e find nothing in that provision which explicitly requires a Member to
take any particular action in any case. Nor has India pointed to any contextual element which
would suggest that the hortatory word “should” must nonetheless be understood, in Article 21.2
of the DSU, to have the mandatory meaning of “shall”. … In addition, the fact that there is no
specific action set out in Article 21.2 makes it unlikely that Members intended the provision to
be mandatory – the lack of specificity in this regard implies rather a hortatory use of should.’
Id at par 2.667.
64Id at par 2.669. 
Concerns regarding the lack of implementation of this provision were raised
in the run-up to the Doha Ministerial Meeting.60 As a result of discussions
on this issue, agreement was reached to include a provision in the Doha
Implementation Decision specifying that:
… the phrase ‘longer time-frame for compliance’ referred to in Article 10.2 [of
the SPS Agreement], shall be understood to mean normally a period of not less
than 6 months. Where the appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary
protection does not allow scope for the phased introduction of a new measure,
but specific problems are identified by a Member, the Member applying the
measure shall upon request enter into consultations with the country with a view
to finding a mutually satisfactory solution to the problem while continuing to
achieve the importing Member’s appropriate level of protection.61 
The legal effect of article 10.2 has not yet been established in the case law.
Therefore, once again, guidance may be sought from the interpretation of
similarly worded SDT provisions in other WTO agreements. The
Compliance Panel in EC-Bed Linen was faced with the question whether
there was a violation of article 21.2 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), which provides that special attention ‘should’ be
applied to matters affecting developing country members with respect to
measures that have been the subject of dispute settlement.62 It found that this
article contains no obligation to take any particular action, noting the use of
the hortatory word ‘should’ and the fact that article 21.2 does not set out any
specific action.63 However, the panel stated that article 21.2 is not devoid of
meaning but ‘clearly reflects the concern of Members with ensuring that
appropriate attention is given the interests of developing Members, and thus
states an important general policy’.64 It thus found it appropriate that the
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65Award of the Arbitrator Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry
(Article 21.3) WT/DS54/15, WT/DS55/14 WT/DS59/13 WT/DS64/12 at par 24.
66Panel Report European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed
Linen from India - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by India WT/DS141/RW 24 April 2003
as modified by the Appellate Body Report WT/DS141/AB/RW at par 2.669. This issue was not
appealed.
67Article 13.1 of the DSU, with regard to the right of a panel to seek information, provides, ‘A
Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by a panel for such information as
the panel considers necessary and appropriate’. (Emphasis added.)
68Appellate Body Report Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft
WT/DS70/AB/R 20 August 1999 at par 187.
69In this regard, the Appellate Body stated, ‘So to rule would be to reduce to an illusion and a
vanity the fundamental right of Members to have disputes arising between them resolved
through the system and proceedings for which they bargained in concluding the DSU. We are
bound to reject an interpretation that promises such consequences.’ Id at par 189.
70Another example of where the Appellate Body gave binding force to a provision in which
‘should’ rather than ‘shall’ is used, is article 11 of the DSU which provides that, ‘… a panel
should make an objective assessment of the matter before it. ...’ While it did not expressly
address the issue of the use of the word ‘should’ in this article, the Appellate Body referred
several times to the ‘duty’ of a panel to make an objective assessment, and called this an
‘obligation’. See Appellate Body Report EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones) WT/DS26/AB/R 13 February 1998 DSR 1998 I 135 at par 133.
arbitrator in another case65 had found guidance in this provision in his
interpretation of article 21.3 of the DSU with regard to the determination of
a reasonable period of time to comply with the recommendations and
rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body. It further held, ‘There may be any
number of ways in which the policy set forth in Article 21.2 might be
effectuated. However, nothing in that provision obliges any Member
actually to effectuate that general policy, or to do so in any particular way in
any particular case.’66
By contrast, outside the context of SDT provisions, the Appellate Body in
Canada-Aircraft has been prepared to interpret the word ‘should’ in article
13.1 of the DSU67 as implying an obligation. It held:
Although the word ‘should’ is often used colloquially to imply an
exhortation, or to state a preference, it is not always used in those ways. It
can also be used ‘to express a duty [or] obligation’.68
It justified this finding by reference to the context of the provision, and the
consequences of denying obligatory effect to this provision. The Appellate
Body noted the fact that article 13.1 gives panels a right to seek information,
which right would be rendered illusory if parties had no duty to respond to
requests for information. Further, members would be free to prevent a panel
from carrying out its duties and thereby undermine the negotiated dispute
settlement procedures.69 To avoid these far-reaching consequences, the
Appellate Body saw fit to interpret the word ‘should’ as creating an
obligation.70
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71As set out above, this finding was made with regard to article 21.2 of the DSU, which also
does not set out concrete action, and further contains the word ‘should’ rather than ‘shall’. Panel
Report European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from
India - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by India WT/DS141/RW 24 April 2003 as modified
by the Appellate Body Report WT/DS141/AB/RW at par 2.669.
72The argument here goes one step further than the approach followed with respect to article 15
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in that, unlike article 15.2, article 10.2 of the SPS Agreement
is not couched in mandatory terms. However, in light of the fact that non-mandatory language
is not seen by the Appellate Body as an impediment to the creation of obligations in cases where
the context so demands, it would seem that such an interpretation is a logical extension of this
line of reasoning.
What guidance can we find in these cases for the interpretation of article
10.2 of the SPS Agreement? It appears that in certain specific cases the
Appellate Body is willing to interpret a provision containing the word
‘should’ as mandatory. However, this seems limited to cases where the
context of the provision indicates that an obligation was intended, without
which negotiated rights would be made illusory. In other cases, panels
would seem reluctant to give binding force to a provision containing the
word ‘should’, particularly if it does not set out any specific action. 
Article 10.2 of the SPS Agreement would seem to fall closer to the first than
the second situation. Its context includes article 10.1, which is framed in
mandatory terms. While the lack of operational language delineating the
precise extent or nature of the obligation in article 10.1 means that it is
unlikely to be interpreted as requiring a developed country member to do
anything, it cannot be ‘devoid of meaning’. It would seem logical that it
should be seen as reflecting ‘the concern of Members with ensuring that
appropriate attention is given the interests of developing Members, and thus
[as stating] an important general policy’.71 As a result, it should guide the
interpretation of the rest of article 10, including article 10.2. Otherwise, the
right of developing country members to rely on this negotiated obligation
would be illusory. 
Unlike article 10.1, and contrary to the situation in Canada-Aircraft, article
10.2 does set out specific actions to give effect to its provisions. It
concretely calls on members to allow longer time frames for compliance
with new SPS measures on products of interest to developing country
members, where the level of SPS protection allows. The time frame has
further been specified as usually six months in the Implementation Decision.
Thus, article 10.2, it is argued here, should be interpreted as concretely
providing the operational indications for compliance with the obligation in
article 10.1, in much the same way as article 15.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement is regarded as setting out obligations operationalising the
provisions of article 15.1 of that agreement.72 Article 10.2 therefore lays
down an enforceable obligation on members to provide longer compliance
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73An indication that Annex B par 2 is regarded as an SDT provision is the fact that it is included in
the secretariat’s review of SDT provisions, conducted for purposes of the Doha Round negotiations
on SDT. See CTD Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO
Agreements and Decisions. A Review of Mandatory Special and Differential Treatment Provisions.
Note by the Secretariat. Addendum WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev 1/Add 2 21 December 2001 9-10.
74In its review of SDT provisions, the WTO Secretariat classifies this provision as a mandatory
provision containing an ‘obligation of result’. See id at 10.
periods, of usually six months, to developing countries so as to maintain
their export opportunities, in all cases where such phased introduction of
new SPS measures would not threaten the level of protection sought by the
importing member.
Reasonable adaptation periods
Another provision in the SPS Agreement that aims to allow sufficient time for
producers to adapt to new SPS measures can be found in paragraph 2 of Annex
B. It provides that members ‘shall’ allow a reasonable interval between the
publication of an SPS measure and its entry into force for producers in
exporting members (particularly in developing countries) to adapt to the new
measure, except in urgent circumstances. It differs from article 10.2 in that it
provides for delaying the entry into force of an SPS measure, rather than just
extending the period of time for compliance therewith.
As the reasonable adaptation period required by Annex B, paragraph 2, must be
granted equally to both developed and developing country exporting members,
this provision is not an SDT provision in the strict sense of the term. However,
this provision does hold particular advantages for developing countries. As
developing countries often face more difficulties in adapting to new SPS
measures than do their developed counterparts, the provision makes specific
reference to developing countries. This implies that in determining the
reasonable adaptation period to be provided for compliance with new SPS
measures, a member should have particular regard to the time needed by the
affected developing country members to adapt to the new requirements. For this
reason, it can be seen as an SDT provision in the broader sense of the term.73
Unlike article 10.2, the binding and enforceable nature of paragraph 2 of
Annex B is beyond doubt.74 It is both worded in a mandatory fashion and
specifically identifies the action required. Further, the specific reference in
this provision to developing countries would make article 10.1 relevant to
its interpretation, as part of the context of the provision. This would add
further support to its enforceable nature, as a provision giving effect to the
general policy contained in article 10.1.
Despite these strong indications of the enforceability of the requirement of a
reasonable adaptation period, lack of implementation of this provision
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75Ministerial Conference Implementation-Related Issues n 6 above at par 3.2.
76These statistics were developed by China, on the basis of an analysis of all notifications submitted
in 2002. See Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Report of the Analysis on SPS
Notifications in 2002. Submission by China G/SPS/GEN/378 31 March 2003 par 13.
77Routine notifications are those that are not ‘emergency notifications’, which have a different
notification format. Emergency notifications relate to measures adopted in situations of urgency,
for which a reasonable adaptation period is not required.
78On analysis of all notifications submitted in 2003, China calculated that 9,2 percent of routine
notifications provided at least 6 months adaptation period, 41,4 percent provided a period of less
than 6 months, and 49,4 percent did not specify the date of adoption and/or entry into force of
the measure. See Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Report of the Analysis on
SPS Notifications in 2003. Submission by China G/SPS/GEN/498 on 18 June 2004 par 15.
79The concept of ‘urgency’ is also found in article 4.8 and 4.9 of the DSU, which allow for
shorter consultation periods and the acceleration of dispute settlement proceedings in cases of
urgency, including those concerning perishable goods. This issue came before a panel in
Canada-Patent Term where the US requested expedited consideration of the dispute under
article 4.9 of the DSU on the grounds that premature expiration of patents during the dispute
settlement procedure caused irreparable harm to the patent owners. The panel did not examine
the requirement of urgency, but noted that due to other demands on panelists’ time, it could not
accelerate the timetable prior to the first substantive meeting. It then fixed its timetable
according to the minimum periods of the proposed timetable provided in Working Procedures
in Appendix 3 to the DSU, since Canada did not object to such a timetable (see Panel Report
Canada-Term of Patent Protection WT/DS170/R 12 October 2000, as upheld by the Appellate
persisted. This led developing countries to raise this as an implementation
issue to be addressed before launching the Doha Round of negotiations.
Following discussions in this regard, the reasonable adaptation period, for
purposes of Annex B, paragraph 2, was specified in the Doha
Implementation Decision to mean normally a period of not less than six
months. However, in each specific case, regard must be had to the
circumstances of the measure and actions necessary for its implementation.
The Implementation Decision further notes that the entry into force of trade
liberalising measures should not be unnecessarily delayed.75 
Despite the six-month specification in the Implementation Decision,
statistics for 200276 show that only 3,7 percent of routine notifications77
provided for an adaptation period of at least six months. A further 34,2
percent of notifications provided an adaptation period shorter than six
months, and 62,1 percent did not state the date of adoption and/or entry into
force. This situation showed only slight improvement in 2003.78
The frequent failures to comply with paragraph 2 of Annex B have never been
challenged in dispute settlement proceedings, notwithstanding its apparently
binding and enforceable nature. This may be due to the fact that the
enforcement thereof is hindered by a loophole, namely the proviso that a
reasonable adaptation period need not be granted in ‘urgent circumstances’.
There is no further clarification of what types of situation would be deemed
urgent.79 The risk therefore exists that members may interpret urgency broadly
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Body WT/DS170/AB/R par 1.5). Thus, there is as yet no real guidance on how a panel might
interpret ‘urgency’. In addition, urgency in article 4.8 and 4.9 of the DSU seems to relate to the
risk of economic damage pending dispute settlement proceedings, whereas urgency in paragraph
2 of Annex B of the SPS Agreement relates to risks to the life or health of humans, animals or
plants. Panels are therefore likely to give a broader interpretation to urgency in the latter than
in the former case.
80In EC-Hormones, the Appellate Body first dealt with the issue of the standard of review to be
applied by panels under the SPS Agreement, and it emphasised the need for the standard of review
to reflect the balance created in that agreement between the jurisdictional competences transferred
by members to the WTO and those retained by them. Nether the panel nor the Appellate Body is
authorised to change this balance. As the SPS Agreement is silent on this issue, the Appellate Body
held that article 11 of the DSU articulates the appropriate standard of review applicable both to the
determination of the facts and to their legal characterisation. It further held that article 11 sets out
a standard of review that is neither total deference nor de novo review, but rather an ‘objective
assessment’. See Appellate Body report EC-Hormones pars 114-116.
81While it is not the purpose of this article to address in detail the question of the standard of
review to be applied by panels in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, it is necessary to point
out that this issue is problematic. It is not completely clear what an ‘objective assessment’
and thus be disinclined to grant the required adaptation period. In the absence
of any criteria for the determination of urgency, developing members may be
reluctant to incur the costs of challenging a refusal to grant an adaptation
period before a panel due to the uncertainty regarding what a panel might
regard as ‘urgent’. 
There is a risk that a panel will readily find that urgency exists in most cases
where SPS measures comply with the remaining requirements of the SPS
Agreement, since such measures address scientifically proven risks to
human, plant or animal life or health. A panel may be hesitant to interfere
with the determination by a member in such a sensitive policy area. This
may result in an overly broad interpretation of ‘urgency’, which would
diminish the utility of the provision for reasonable adaptation periods in
Annex B, paragraph 2. 
Instead, it is recommended that panels shoulder their responsibility to interpret
and apply this provision, in order to guard the negotiated balance reflected in
the SPS Agreement between the right of members to protect health in their
territories, and the goal of increasing market access for food and agricultural
products, including through SDT of developing countries. While this task is not
an easy one, it is nevertheless one which panels are obliged to carry out under
article 11 of the DSU. This article requires that panels carry out an ‘objective
assessment’ of the matter before them, which has been interpreted to mean
neither de novo review of the matter, nor complete deference to the deter-
mination of a member.80 Therefore, when addressing claims under paragraph 2
of Annex B, a panel must not simply defer to the determination by a member
that the situation was urgent, but must objectively examine the facts and the
applicability of the legal requirements of this provision to such facts.81 Such
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entails, nor how far a panel may go in reviewing national determinations. Between total
deference and de novo review is a wide spectrum of possibilities, and the lack of guidance for
panels in this respect gives cause for concern in a field such as that of SPS regulation, where
disputes turn on the evaluation of complex scientific facts. See further on this point Ehlermann
and Lockhart ‘Standard of review in WTO law’ (2004) 7/3 Journal of International Economic
Law 491-521; and Joost Pauwelyn ‘Does the WTO Stand for “defence to” or “interference with”
National Health Authorities when applying the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement)?’ in Cottier and Mavroidis (eds) The role of the judge in
international trade regulation: Experience and lessons for the WTO (2003) 175-192.
82Not all these international standard setting bodies are international organisations in the strict sense
of the term. However, the SPS Agreement does seem to regard them as such, as evinced by the wor-
ding of Annex A par 3, which in its definition of international standards, guidelines and recommen-
dations, lists the three main standard-setting bodies (CAC, OIE, and IPPC) and then provides that
‘for matters not covered by the above organizations …’ regard may be had to standards, guidelines
and recommendations ‘promulgated by other relevant international organizations, open for
membership to all Members, as identified by the Committee’. (Emphasis added.)
policing of compliance with this provision, including the urgency requirement
justifying deviation, would encourage members to take the obligation to
provide a reasonable adaptation period seriously.
Facilitation of participation in international standard setting
Another area where there is a need to take account of the special needs of
developing countries, is in international standard setting. The issue of
developing country participation in international standard setting is currently at
the forefront of policy discussions and reforms in the standard-setting bodies.
Participation in the numerous committees of the international bodies where
harmonised standards are initiated, developed and proposed for adoption is
onerous. It requires not only financial and human resources for attendance of
meetings, but also scientific data and technical capabilities for the formulation
of national positions regarding standards of interest to the country. An actively
involved private sector is also crucial to provide important inputs for the
identification of areas where standards are needed, and the formulation of
standards that are feasible and appropriate for national conditions. However,
this is often lacking in developing countries. These factors have led to
assertions that the standards set by the international bodies do not cover areas
of interest for developing countries and do not reflect a level of protection that
is realistic or desirable for developing countries. Deficient developing country
participation in international standard setting has, since the coming into force
of the SPS Agreement, significant implications for developing country trade.
Even at the time of drafting the SPS Agreement, the importance of improving
developing country participation in international standard setting was
recognised. This concern is reflected in article 10.4, which provides that
members ‘should’ encourage and facilitate the active participation of
developing countries in the relevant international organisations. The ‘relevant
international organizations’ would seem to be a reference to the international
standard-setting bodies.82 Although it falls under article 10, which is entitled
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83Article 9 of the SPS Agreement contains provisions on technical assistance. 
84This would be in line with the approach of the panel in EC-Pipe Fittings where the second
sentence of article 15 was held to provide ‘operational indications as to the nature of the specific
action required [by the first sentence]’. Panel Report EC Pipe Fittings n 40 above at par 7.68.
85Panel Report Steel Plate from India n 38 above at par 7.110. This is also in line with the
approach of the panel in EC-Pipe Fittings n 40 above at par 7.68.
‘Special and Differential Treatment’, this paragraph seems to fit more
comfortably into the category of technical assistance provisions.83 It does not
create flexibilities for developing countries, but rather calls for assistance to
promote the participation of developing countries in standard setting. 
Article 10.4 is addressed to WTO members, rather than to the international
standard setting bodies themselves. This is logical since the WTO
agreements can only create obligations for members and organs of the
WTO. Despite the fact that the SPS Agreement makes use of the standards
set by the relevant international standard-setting bodies, these bodies are not
under the authority of the WTO but are independent institutions. Any WTO
provisions relating to improving developing country participation in the
standard-setting process in these international bodies must therefore be
addressed to WTO members. These members may give effect to article 10.4
in their individual capacities through bilateral technical assistance
initiatives, or through efforts undertaken within the relevant standard-setting
bodies, in their capacities as members of these bodies. 
Like article 10.2, discussed above, article 10.4 is couched in hortatory
language and the question arises whether any binding obligations can be
derived from its terms. The same argument developed above would apply here,
to support the interpretation of article 10.4 in the light of the guiding principle,
laid down in article 10.1, that developing countries interests ‘shall’ be taken
into account in the development and application of SPS measures. International
SPS standards can be seen as part of the process of development of SPS
measures, as they are required to form the basis of SPS measures adopted by
members, unless deviation can be scientifically justified. Consequently, article
10.4 should be seen as one indication of how effect must be given to the
general obligation in article 10.1.84 It should therefore be seen as a binding
obligation, despite its hortatory language.
However, the question remains whether an enforceable obligation will be
derived from the terms of article 10.4, calling on members to ‘encourage and
facilitate’ active developing country participation in standard setting. Since no
concrete action is specified indicating how encouragement and facilitation
must be given effect, there is a risk that panels will see this provision as unable
to create an obligation for members as ‘Members cannot be expected to
comply with an obligation whose parameters are entirely undefined’.85 
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86Such other organisations include the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the World Health
Organisation, which are the parent bodies of the Codex Alimentarius Commission.
87 The finding with regard to article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement from which this analogy
is drawn is Panel Report EC-Bed Linen n 34 above at par 6.233. Here, as mentioned above, the
panel held: ‘Taken in its context, however, and in light of the object and purpose of Article 15, we
do consider that the “exploration” of possibilities must be actively undertaken by the developed
country authorities with a willingness to reach a positive outcome. Thus, in our view, Article 15
imposes no obligation to actually provide or accept any constructive remedy that may be identified
and/or offered. It does, however, impose an obligation to actively consider, with an open mind, the
possibility of such a remedy prior to imposition of an anti-dumping measure that would affect the
essential interests of a developing country.’
88A trust fund has been established by the FAO and WHO to promote developing country
participation in the Codex Alimentarius Commission. The International Plant Protection Convention
has created a trust fund under FAO rules to enhance developing country participation in its standard-
setting meetings and activities. The World Animal Health Organization (OIE) will establish a similar
trust fund before the end of 2005, with support from the European Union. These trust funds are
funded by contributions by donor agencies and member countries. Further, the OIE provides
financial support for the participation of Chief Veterinary Officers of its member countries in its
standard-setting activities. See Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Review of the
Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures. Report Adopted by the Committee on 30 June 2005 G/SPS/36 11 July 2005 par 43.
Such an outcome would be unfortunate. It is not possible to lay down in the
SPS Agreement precise actions required from members to promote developing
country participation in international standard setting. This would mean trying
to influence directly the international standard-setting bodies or other
international organisations,86 which is outside the sphere of competence of the
WTO. Nevertheless, there are many opportunities for actions by members to
promote developing country participation. It would therefore be better if,
instead, panels would interpret article 10.4 by analogy to the case law on article
15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement discussed above. Accordingly, a panel
could find that interpreting the words of this article in its context (with
reference to article 10.1) and in light of its object and purpose leads to the
conclusion that while no obligation to actually increase developing country
participation can be derived from article 10.4, it does create an enforceable
obligation on members at least to actively take steps, ‘with a willingness to
reach a positive outcome’87 to improve such participation.
It should be noted that both individual WTO members and the international
standard-setting bodies themselves are taking steps to address the problem of
developing country participation.88 In addition, the SPS Committee has
developed the practice of holding its meetings back-to-back with meetings of
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, to enable SPS officials to attend both
meetings in one trip. Further, at the Doha meeting the heads of the FAO,
WHO, OIE, World Bank and WTO issued a joint statement indicating their
commitment to enhancing developing countries’ capacity to participate
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89Directors-General of the Food and Agriculture Organisation the Office International Des
Epizooties the World Health Organisation and the World Trade Organisation and the President of
the World Bank Participation of Developing Countries in the Development Application of
International Standards, Guidelines and Recommendations on Food Safety, Animal and Plant
Health (2001).
90The secretariat has created a self-subscribing e-mail list to receive SPS notifications and other
non-restricted SPS documents. WTO members and interested public can subscribe to this list.
91The secretariat sends all SPS-related documents to members in English as well as the other
WTO working languages of their choice (French or Spanish).
effectively in international standard setting.89 This initiative led to the
establishment of the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF), which
aims to enhance developing country capacity in the area of SPS standards.
Such efforts seem to be driven by the need to ensure the legitimacy and
acceptability of the international standards, in the light of the changed situation
since the coming into force of the SPS Agreement, rather than by any
perception of an obligation to do so by members under article 10.4.
Nevertheless, the recognition of the binding and enforceable nature of article
10.4 in dispute settlement would serve as an added impetus for such actions.
Assistance in monitoring of notifications
Developing countries face constraints in fully benefitting from the increased
transparency of SPS measures achieved by the SPS Agreement if they do not
have the skilled human resources to monitor the notifications and identify those
of interest to them. For this reason, under paragraph 9 of Annex B, the WTO
Secretariat is obliged to draw the attention of developing countries to any
notifications relating to products of interest to them. This aims at enabling
developing countries to take full advantage of the increased transparency
resulting from the disciplines of the SPS Agreement despite the fact that they
may lack the resources to keep track of all notifications. 
The question of enforceability of this provision through dispute settlement does
not arise, as the WTO dispute settlement system is limited to disputes between
members. Thus, claims can only be brought by a WTO member against
measures taken by another member and not against acts or omissions of the
WTO Secretariat. Nevertheless, the Secretariat takes its task under Annex B,
paragraph 9, seriously and has made every effort to give effect to this provision. 
In practice, it is difficult to determine which notifications may be of interest to
each developing country member. This was particularly the case initially when
notifications were rudimentary and provided little information. The Secretariat
has thus revised the notification format to be used by members, to include a box
on which countries are most likely to be affected by the notification. The notifi-
cations received are transmitted by electronic mail90 to each member’s enquiry
point, and in paper form to all members’ permanent missions to the WTO.91 
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92See, for example, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures List of Notifications -
Note by the Secretariat G/SPS/W/19 19 June 1995.
93Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Electronic Transmission of Notifications
to National Enquiry Points: Note by the Secretariat G/SPS/GEN/136 9 August 1999. These lists
can be found in the series G/SPS/GEN/* by searching under the keyword ‘notifications’.
In addition, the Secretariat decided to implement its obligation by
circulating lists of all notified SPS measures to all WTO members. Initially
these periodic lists contained merely the official document number of the
notification and the date in which it was issued,92 and were therefore not
very useful for developing country members. Following consultations with
members on this issue, the Secretariat decided, in 1999, to draw up a
monthly document identifying all notifications received that month, with a
short summary of the products covered by each notification, the countries or
regions identified in the notification as likely to be affected, the nature of
the measure, and the deadline for the submission of comments.93 This
additional information facilitates the monitoring of relevant notifications by
developing country authorities. The summary document is sent to all
members in the same way as the notifications.
These efforts indicate that this SDT provision, addressed to the WTO
Secretariat, is implemented effectively, within the limits of what is possible
given the information provided by members in their notifications of SPS
measures.
SDT with regard to obligations under the SPS Agreement
Not only is compliance with foreign SPS measures a problem for many
developing countries, the implementation of the obligations contained in the
SPS Agreement may also be costly and burdensome. As has been set out
above, a certain level of regulatory capacity, infrastructure and skilled
human resources is necessary in order to meet the requirements of the SPS
Agreement. In countries in which well-functioning SPS regulatory systems
are not in place, administrative systems are poor, or sufficient scientific
capacity, both in the form of properly equipped laboratories and trained
scientific staff, is lacking, complying with the SPS Agreement requires
significant adjustments. 
It is important to ensure that the regulatory disciplines of the SPS
Agreement do not have the effect of forcing developing countries to divert
resources from other areas of public spending which may be more crucial to
their development needs, such as the provision of health and education
services. For this reason, some additional flexibility is needed with regard to
the compliance obligations of developing countries. The extent to which this
is provided for in the SPS Agreement bears examination.
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94An example of an LDC for which the transition periods were not sufficient is Bangladesh,
which is currently not in a position to comply with its notification obligations. Despite having
set up its required National Notification Authority and Enquiry Point, it has never notified an
Delayed compliance with the SPS Agreement
Many of the disciplines of the SPS Agreement reflect ‘best practices’ of
developed countries with regard to SPS regulation. For example, currently in
developed countries scientific risk assessments are an inherent part of the
regulatory process. Similarly, it is common practice in these countries to invite
public comments on regulatory proposals and to publish new regulations
promptly. While often the adoption of such regulatory practices by developing
countries has long-term benefits, they lack the resources to do so immediately.
For this reason, such countries need additional time for the implementation of
their obligations under the SPS Agreement. Reflecting recognition of this
situation, article 14 of the SPS Agreement makes provision for delayed
implementation of the obligations under the agreement for developing and
least-developed country (LDC) members. LDCs were granted a five-year
transitional period, from the entry into force of the WTO Agreement on 1
January 1995, for implementation of their obligations. Other developing
members were given a two-year transitional period, where lack of technical
expertise, infrastructure or resources prevented immediate implementation of
their obligations. However, this possibility did not extend to their transparency
and information obligations for non-LDC members. 
This exclusion can be attributed to the fact that transparency of SPS measures
is crucial to the operation of the SPS Committee as a forum for consultations
on SPS issues. It enables members to monitor compliance with the SPS
Agreement by other members, and to raise their concerns at an early-enough
stage in the regulatory process when changes can still be made to the SPS
measure at issue. It is also of key importance for exporting firms, as it creates a
predictable trading environment. Therefore, developing countries (other than
LDCs) were, in principle, obliged to comply immediately with the
transparency provisions in the SPS Agreement.
The transitional period expired in January 2000 for least-developed members,
and in January 1997 for other developing members. As one might expect, not
all developing countries and LDCs have been able to comply fully with their
obligations under the SPS Agreement within the transition periods. Some
obligations, such as those relating to risk assessments, may require far-reaching
reforms and institutional capacity. In addition, such reforms are often not a
priority for government spending in countries with more urgent development
needs. In addition, although the transitional period for non-LDC developing
countries does not apply to the transparency obligations, it can be envisioned
that immediate compliance would be impossible for some of these countries.94
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SPS measure. See Trade Policy Review Body Trade Policy Review: Bangladesh - Report by the
Secretariat WT/TPR/S/68 3 April 2000 Part II par 25 and Table II.23.
95As of May 2005, out of 148 members 139 had notified an enquiry point, 130 had identified
their national notification authority, and 87 (ie 59%) had notified at least one new or revised SPS
measure. See Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Implementation of the
Transparency Obligations as of 18 June 2004. Note by the Secretariat – Revision
G/SPS/GEN/27/Rev 13 21 June 2004 pars 26-27.
Therefore, although the transitional periods in article 14 represent one of the
most effective forms of SDT since their application was automatic and did
not depend on implementation by other members, they were not sufficient to
address fully developing country constraints with regard to meeting their
obligations under the SPS Agreement. 
Time-limited exemptions from specific obligations
To create additional flexibility for developing countries that have difficulties
with compliance with their obligations, beyond that provided by the transition
periods, article 10.3 of the SPS Agreement provides that the SPS Committee
‘is enabled to grant’ developing countries, upon request, specified, time-limited
exemptions from all or some of their obligations under the SPS Agreement.
This is done with the aim of enabling developing countries to comply with
their obligations by giving them extra time to adjust to their new obligations,
and takes account of their financial, trade and development needs. 
Decisions of the SPS Committee are taken by consensus in accordance with
article 12.1 of the SPS Agreement. Thus, any exemptions requested under
article 10.3 would need the tacit approval of all members. While the
Committee is enabled to grant requested exemptions, it has no obligation to do
so. Neither are concrete criteria laid down according to which the Committee
should evaluate developing country requests under article 10.3. The only
guidance for the Committee in this article is the provision that the Committee is
enabled to grant such requests from developing countries ‘taking into account
their financial, trade and development needs’. This leaves a very broad
discretion to the Committee in this regard. The actions of the members acting
within the SPS Committee are not guided by the general policy contained in
article 10.1 as waivers cannot be regarded as covered by its reference to the
‘preparation and application’ of SPS measures by members. 
It is difficult to determine whether members within the SPS Committee would
be disposed to grant requests under article 10.3 easily, or instead be reluctant to
do so, as to date no developing country or LDC has requested such an
exemption. This despite the fact that some remain in breach of certain
obligations under the SPS Agreement, such as the obligation to establish a
National Notification Authority and Enquiry Point, to publish and notify all
new SPS measures,95 or to base their SPS measures on either an international
standard or a risk assessment. 
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96In addition, it is useful to bear in mind, as noted above, that there is no possibility to challenge
the action of a WTO organ in dispute settlement proceedings, as these are limited to disputes
between members. Thus the issue of enforceability of article 10.3 does not arise.
It seems possible that the hesitance of developing countries to make use of
this exemption possibility is due to their uncertainty regarding the
likelihood that their requests will be granted, given the broad discretion of
the SPS Committee in this regard, and the fact that it takes decisions by
consensus. Developing countries’ failure to make use of article 10.3 may
reflect their unwillingness to draw attention to their non-compliance in the
face of this uncertainty. If the SPS Committee were to refuse to grant an
exemption, the requesting country will have exposed itself to the risk of
challenges for violation of the SPS Agreement.96
Some developing countries have proposed that article 10.3 be amended to
oblige the SPS Committee to grant requests for time-limited exemptions for
developing countries. However, this would have the effect of creating an
automatic waiver, excusing developing countries from any obligations
under the SPS Agreement upon request. When one bears in mind that intra-
developing country trade in food and agricultural products is significant, the
creation of such a loophole in the obligations would be to the detriment of
developing countries themselves by reducing their possibilities to enforce
the market access achievements of the SPS Agreement against other
developing countries. Instead, the creation of clear and concrete criteria to
determine when the ‘financial, trade and development needs’ of developing
countries preclude immediate compliance with specific obligations may be
more useful. 
Exemption from elements of the notification obligations
As stated above, compliance with the transparency obligations of the SPS
Agreement can be particularly costly and onerous for developing countries.
While transparency is important for the proper operation of the SPS
Agreement, some of these obligations are less crucial than others and may
create an unnecessary burden for developing countries. This is reflected in
the additional flexibility allowed in paragraph 8 of Annex B, with regard to
documentation for notified measures.
This provision contains an obligation to provide, upon request, copies of the
documents, or in case of lengthy documents, summaries of the documents
covered by a specific notification in one of the official languages of the
WTO. However, its application is limited to developed countries, and it can
thus be seen as providing a specific waiver to developing countries from its
obligations of translation and summary. This is clearly an attempt to reduce
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the burden on developing countries that results from compliance with some
of the transparency provisions. 
Once again, as was the case with the transitional periods, this SDT provision
is automatic in application and requires no implementation. It can thus be
regarded as an effective, albeit very limited, form of SDT.
Conclusion
If developing countries are to benefit fully from the rules of the SPS
Agreement, appropriate flexibilities are necessary to take account of their
special constraints. It is therefore important that the provision of SDT in this
agreement not remain at the level of rhetoric, but be effective and operational.
Although implementation of SDT in the SPS Agreement has been
disappointing to date, the above examination of the various forms of SDT
provided for in the SPS Agreement indicates that real possibilities exist for
panels, such as the panel in the EC-Biotech dispute, to operationalise SDT
provisions through effective treaty interpretation. Although these
possibilities are not limitless, they do allow for the recognition that several
provisions contain enforceable obligations that give effect to the general
policy of consideration for the special needs of developing countries,
thereby ensuring that the negotiated rights enshrined in these provisions are
not rendered illusory. 
This conclusion has implications for the ongoing Doha Round negotiations
on SDT, at least as they relate to the SPS Agreement. The deadlocked
negotiations reflect an impasse between two opposing positions. On the one
side are developing countries, who view the operationalisation of SDT
provisions through amendments or clarifications to strengthen them and
make them enforceable, as merely ensuring the implementation of existing
negotiated rules. They are therefore not prepared to make concessions in
other areas to get, as quid pro quo, the agreement of developed countries to
these amendments. On the other side are several developed countries, who
regard the strengthening of SDT provisions as the creation of new rights and
obligations, and thus as something developing countries should ‘pay’ for by
means of concessions in other areas. 
Once it becomes clear that most of the existing SDT provisions can be
operationalised by effective treaty interpretation in dispute settlement
proceedings, the basis for this deadlock falls away. Members are then left
with two options. They can leave the fleshing out of SDT provisions to
panels and the Appellate Body, on a case-by-case basis as they are faced
with claims such as that of Argentina in EC-Biotech, or instead they can
reach political agreement on the nature and extent of these obligations,
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through amendments or clarifications to the relevant articles in the SDT
negotiations. The latter option would allow members to develop an
acceptable framework for the provision of SDT, in order to ensure that the
flexibilities it creates do not threaten the careful balance achieved by the
SPS Agreement between the right of members to protect health and the
promotion of market access.
